



The Jahmee Inquisition...

From At-Tadmuriyyah of Shaykh ul-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah

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Speaking About Some of the Attributes Is Like Speaking About the Rest¹

As for the first principle, then it is said: Speaking about some of the Attributes is like speaking about others.

[1. Refutation of the Ash'ariyyah – Affirmers of Seven Attributes]

If the one being addressed is one who affirms that Allaah is “Hayy” characterised with life, and “Aleem” characterised with knowledge, and “Qadeer” characterised with power, “Samee” characterised with hearing, “Baseer” characterised with sight, “Mutakallim” characterised with speech, “Mureed” characterised with will, and he considers all of that to have a reality, but then disputes concerning His “mahabbah” (love), “ridaa” (pleasure), “ghadab” (anger), “karaahiyyah” (hatred), and then declares that to be “majaz” (allegorical), and then explains all of that to be “iraadah” (i.e. synonymous with Allaah’s will), or to be something that is representative of created things, such as favours and punishments [meted out to the creation], (rather than being attributes for Allaah).

Then it is said to him: There is no difference between that which you have affirmed and that which you have negated, since speech regarding one attribute is just like speech regarding the other.

If you said: His will (iraadah) is like the will of the creation, and His love, pleasure, and anger is also like that (i.e. like those attributes of the creation), then this is tamtheel (likening to the creation). And if you said: He has a will (iraadah) which befits Him only, just like the creation has a will which befits them, then it is said to you, then likewise He has love (mahabbah) which befits Him only, and the creation has love which befits them only, and He has

¹ “At-Tadmuriyyah” (Ed. Muhammad bin Awdah as-Saudi, Maktabah al-Ubaykaan), pp.31-43.

pleasure, and anger which befits Him only, and the creation too has pleasure and anger which befits them only.

And if he says: Anger (ghadab) is the heart's blood being agitated to seeking revenge. Then it is said in reply, and will (iraadah) is the inclination of the soul to bringing about that which benefits it, and repelling what harms it. And if you said, "But this is the [nature of the] will (iraadah) of the creation only", it is said in reply to you, "And this is the [nature of the] anger of the creation only".

And similarly (this line of reasoning) is made binding upon any talk about His speech, hearing, seeing, knowledge and power.

So if he negates from [the attributes of] anger, love, and pleasure and whatever is like that – so if he negates from these attributes that which unique and specific to the creation, then this is also negated from [the attributes of] hearing, seeing and speech, and all of the attributes.

And if he said: There is no reality to these attributes except in what is specifically related to the creation (concerning the true nature of these attributes), and thus it is obligatory to negate them. Then it is said in reply to him: And it is likewise for [the attributes of] hearing, seeing, speech, knowledge and power.

For the one who differentiates between some attributes and others, whatever he replies to his own opponent is also said in reply to him. So when the Mu'tazili says to him (i.e. the Ash'ari): He does not have a will and nor speech established with Him, since these attributes cannot be found except in the creation. So he (the Ash'ari) explains to him that these attributes belong to the one who has no beginning, and that they are not like the attributes of those who were brought about (muhdath, i.e. created by Him, after being non-existent). So this is the same reply (given to the Ash'ari) by those who affirm all the attributes, such as love, pleasure and what is like that.

If he then says: I affirm those attributes by way of the intellect. Since, action (fi'l) is indicative of power (qudrah), and diversification (in what has been created) indicates will (iraadah), and precision and exactness indicates knowledge ('ilm). And these attributes necessitate life (hayaat), and the living must have hearing (sam'), seeing (basr) and speech (kalaam).

Then all of those who affirm (all the attributes) say to him: There are two replies to you.

The first: That it is said, the absence of specific [intellectual] evidence [for something] does not at the same time necessitate the absence of this specific thing. So let us accept that this path of intellectual evidence that you have adopted does not affirm this [attribute], then at the same time, it does not negate it either. And it is not for you to negate it without any evidence (for its negation). Since, the one who negates [an attribute], he must bring evidence, just like the one who affirms [an attribute], he must bring evidence. And the revelation (the Book and the Sunnah) has given evidence for (the attribute), and nothing has come in the way of this (i.e. to negate it), neither an intellectual barrier nor another textual barrier. Hence, it is obligatory to affirm whatever the evidence that is free from anything that opposes it has affirmed.

The second: That it is said, it is possible to affirm these attributes with the same reasoning that you affirmed those attributes by way of intellectual reasoning. So it is said, that the provision of benefits and favours to the servants by way of benevolence to them indicates “rahmah” (mercy) in exactly the same way that diversification (that is observed in the creation) indicates will. And ennobling those who obey (Allaah) indicates His love (mahabbah) for them, and punishment of the Kuffaar indicates His hatred (bughd) for them, just as is witnessed outwardly (in this life), and also informed (in His Book) that He ennoble His friends and punishes His enemies. And also what exists of praiseworthy objectives and goals (within the creation), in His handiwork (maf’oolaat) and in His commandments (ma’mooraat) - all of which lead and end up in praiseworthy end-results – give evidence to His far reaching wisdom (hikmah) in exactly the same manner that diversification (in the creation) indicates His will.²

And it is for this reason that whatever is in the Qur’aan concerning the explanation of what is in His creation of favours, benefits and wisdoms is much greater than what is in the Qur’aan of what is in the creation being indicative of His will.

[2. Refutation of the Mu’tazilah – Affirmers of the Names Only, Deniers of All the Attributes]

And if the one being addressed is of those who denies the Attributes but affirms the Names, such as the Mu’tazili, the one who says that He is “Hayy” (Living) “Aleem” (Knowing), “Qadeer” (Powerful), but then rejects that He is described with “hayaat” (life), “ilm” (knowledge), “qudrah” (power).

² [Translator’s Note]: Meaning, that what is found in the Qur’aan of the mention of Allaah’s favours, blessings upon the people, and His wisdom in the creation, and His subjection of all that is in the Heavens and the Earth for their use and benefit – then all of that is more numerous than that which is in the Qur’an in relation to the mention or indication of Allaah’s will (iraadah, mashee’ah).

It is said to him: There is no difference between affirmation of the Names and affirmation of the Attributes. For if you were to say that affirmation of [the attributes] of life, knowledge and power necessitates tashbeeh (resemblance to the creation), and tajseem (anthropomorphism), since we do not find anything that is outwardly observed that has attributes, except that it is a body (jism). Then it is said to you: And we do not find anything that is outwardly observed that is named as “hayy” (living), “’aleem” (knowing), “qadeer” (able, powerful), except that it is a body (jism). Hence, if you negated what you negated (of the attributes) due to your not seeing it outwardly except as a body, then you must also negate all the names as well, rather, every single thing, since you do not outwardly observe it, except as a body.

Thus, everything that is used as an argument to negate the Attributes (i.e. the Mu’tazilah) can also be used by the one who negates the Beautiful Names (i.e. the Jahmiyyah and Philosophers, in refutation of the Mu’tazilah). Thus, whatever is a reply to that (in defence of the affirmation of the Names) is also a reply that can be used by the affirmers of the attributes.

[3. Refutation of the Jahmiyyah – Negators of the Names and Attributes]

And if the one being addressed is amongst the Extremists (Ghullaat), the deniers of the Names and Attributes, and he says: I do not say He is “Mawjood” (existing, present), or that He is “Hayy” (living), or “Aleem” (knowing), or “Qadeer” (able, powerful). Rather, these names are only for His creation, or they are only allegorical. Since, affirmation of these names (for Him) necessitates tashbeeh (resemblance) with the [created beings that are] named with “existing, present”, “living”, “knowing” and “able”.

It is said in reply to Him: And it is likewise when you say that He is not (to be named with) “present, existing”, and “living” and “knowing” and “able, powerful”, then this is tashbeeh (resemblance) with the non-existing things (al-ma’doomaat), and this is more repugnant than likening Him with the existing things (al-mawjoodaat).³

So if he says: I deny both negation and affirmation (of names and attributes for Allaah).

It is said to him: Then this makes it binding from your position that you make tashbeeh [of Allaah] (resemblance) with that in which two opposites can come

³ [Translator’s Note]: So this is like when the Jahmee says, “He is not seeing”, “He is not hearing”, “He is not able, powerful”, “He is not one who speaks” and so on – using negations to describe Allaah – claiming that using affirmations (of Names, or attributes) which are found for the creation is tantamount to tashbeeh (likening Allaah to the creation).

together at the same time, which are amongst the impossible things (al-mumtani'aat), for it is impossible for a thing to be existing (mawjood) and non-existent (ma'doom), or not existing and not non-existent. And it is impossible for it to be described with [the attributes] of existence (wujood) and non-existence ('adam), life and death, knowledge and ignorance, or for it be described with a negation of both existence and non-existence (together), or a negation of both life and death, or a negation of both knowledge and ignorance.

If you then say: It is only impossible to negate two opposites from those things that can actually accept either of these two opposites (as names or attributes) to begin with, since in this case, the two opposites (that you have alluded to) are like the relation between the absence and the adoption (or development) of a trait with respect to each other, not like two complete opposites (that are diametrically opposed and each of which cannot exist except with the absence of the other). So for example, concerning a wall, it is not said to it, "it is not blind and nor seeing", or "it is not living and nor dead", since the wall does not accept these (names or attributes) to begin with (i.e. they are not applicable to a wall – either as names or attributes i.e. "living" or "life", "seeing" or "sight" etc.).

It is said to you: Firstly, this is not correct concerning [the two opposites of] existence (wujood) and non-existence ('adam), since these are two diametrically opposed things, by agreement of all the intelligent people. Hence, when one of them is not present, the other one will most certainly be established.

As for what you have mentioned concerning life and death, and knowledge and ignorance (i.e. that they are like the relation between the absence and adoption, development of a trait), then this is merely terminology that was devised by the "Walking Philosophers"⁴, and terminological phrases are not evidence for the negation of intellectually proven realities.

And Allaah the Most High said, **"Those whom they (Al-Mushrikûn) invoke besides Allâh have not created anything but are themselves created. (They are) dead, lifeless, and they know not when they will be raised up."** (An-Nahl 16:20-21). Hence, he named the inanimate thing (al-jamaad) (i.e. the idols), as being "dead", and this matter is also known and famous in the language of the Arabs and others.

⁴ [Tranlators Note]: This is in reference to Aristotle and the Greek Philosophers, those whose habit was to give lectures while walking, and so the students would actually follow them around, as they walked, while the lesson was being given – and hence the name "Walking Philosophers".

And it is also said to you, secondly: That which does not accept description with either life or death, or either of blindness or sight and whatever is similar to that of opposites, then it is more deficient than that which can actually accept these descriptions. So the blind person who can actually accept the description of “sight” (i.e a human person who is blind, can accept the description of sight, even though he does not have it, nevertheless he can be described by it, by virtue of the fact that all humans see and have sight) is more perfect than the inanimate thing which does not accept either of the two (i.e. blindness or sight).

Hence, you have fled from tashbeeh (resemblance) to the animate things that can actually accept attributes of perfection, and you have described Him instead with the attributes of the inanimate things, which do not accept these attributes in principle.

And additionally that which does not accept either of the two attributes of existence and non-existence is more severely impossible than that which can accept either of the two attributes of existence and non-existence⁵ - and even [more impossible] than the combining together of existence and non-existence (in a thing), or the negation of them both (in a thing) [at one and the same time] (while it can actually accept these two opposites).

Hence, that from which you have negated the acceptance of [being described with] existence and non-existence (in principle, fundamentally)⁶ is more

⁵ [Tranlators Note]: So for example, a human being that has not yet been born – and it may or may not be born – then it can accept both the attributes of existence and non-existence. And this human being – even though it does not exist – is more perfect than that which cannot accept the attributes of existence and non-existence at all, in principle. Since this is from the “impossible” things, whereas the human that is not yet born, then even though its existence is not established, it is certainly “possible”.

Just to give another example to make it clear, a particular “hurricane” may or may not come into existence – thus, it can admit to either of the two – existence and non-existence – just like it may also admit to the attributes of “strong” or “mild” or “fierce” or “tame” or “large” or “small”. So it can admit to all of these, which are opposites, and even existence and non-existence. Yet, we can negate all of these attributes from it, but that still does not make this hurricane something that is “impossible” merely by our negation of the variety of two sets of opposites from it. Rather, it is still “possible”. This would make these things (i.e. a human, or a hurricane by way of example), to be more perfect than Allaah, since the Jahmee claims that Allaah cannot accept these attributes to begin with, fundamentally. And hence this renders Allaah to be from the “impossible” things – may Allaah destroy the Jahmite falsehood and empower Ahl us-Sunnah over them and against them, Ameen.

⁶ [Translators Note]: Meaning, that which you say cannot be described with either of these two attributes in principle, and that it cannot admit to, or accept any of these two attributes, at all. And what the Jahmi intends by this is that Allaah cannot be accept the descriptions of “sight” and “blindness” or “life” and “death” in principle – and then he includes in the set of

impossible than that from which you have negated both existence and non-existence (but which can accept either of these two opposites in principle). So when the likes of this (i.e. the latter) is impossible to the sound, clear, intellects, then that (i.e. the former) is even more impossible.

Hence, you have made the obligatory existence – that which can never accept non-existence (i.e. Allaah) – to be from the greatest of the impossible things, and this is the extremity of corruption and contradiction.

And as for those Baatiniyyah, then there are amongst them who actually negate the two opposites of existence and non-existence, yet negating them is just like affirming their combination. Then there are others amongst them who say, “I do not affirm either of the two”. Yet his refusal to affirm one of the two at the same time does not allow the actualisation of any one of the two at the same time. And his condition is like the ignorance of the ignorant person, or the silence of the silent person who will not express the true realities.

So when it is the case that that which does not accept the attributes of existence and non-existence is a greater impossibility than that which can accept any of these two opposites – alongside the negation of these two opposites from it – then that about which it is claimed or estimated that it does not accept either of the [opposites of] life and death, or knowledge and ignorance, or power and inability, or speech and dumbness, or seeing and blindness, or hearing and deafness is closer to being non-existent, and impossible than that about which it is claimed or estimated that it can accept either of the two [opposites] – even though the two [opposites] are negated from it. For in that case, the negation of them both from it, while it can actually accept either of the two as attributes, is closer to existence and what is actually possible.

Whatever [attribute] is permitted to rightfully apply to the one whose existence is obligatory (i.e. Allaah), it becomes obligatory for him, due to the fact that his attributes are not based upon the attributes of others. Hence, when the acceptance of this attribute is permitted, it becomes obligatory, and when the existence of the one (who can accept this attribute) is permitted, he (i.e. his existence) becomes obligatory.

two opposites the attributes of “existence” and “non-existence”! Which would then render the existence of Allaah to be from the greatest of the impossible things (al-mumtani’aat). And this shows that what the saying of Jahmiyyah involves is that Allaah’s existence (and his being described with qualities of perfection) is from the greatest of impossibilities – and we seek refuge in Allaah from that!

And this matter has been dealt with extensively in another place, which is the obligation of His being described with attributes of perfection, those that do not contain any deficiency from any angle whatsoever, was explained.

It is also said to him, thirdly: The agreement in name of some of the Names and Attributes (with those of the creation) is not tashbeeh or tamtheel (resemblance or likeness) – and this [tashbeeh] is what the textual and intellectual evidences themselves negate.

What they (the textual and intellectual evidences) have actually negated is that which would necessitate their sharing (that reality) which is unique to the Creator, from those things that are unique to him by obligation, or permissibility, or impossibility⁷. Hence, it is not permissible that anyone from the creation share with Him in any of that, and nor that any of the creation should share with Him in any of His unique characteristics, the Sublime and Exalted.

As for what you have negated (of the Names and Attributes), then that is established by both legislation (ash-Shar') and intellect, and that you call it "tashbeeh" and "tajseem" is merely a pretence and distortion in front of the ignorant people, those who think it is obligatory to negate every meaning that a person names with this (same) name. And if this had been permitted, then every falsifier would have named the truth with that by which he could make the people flee from it, so that the people reject the truth that is known by both (revealed) text and intellect.

And it is with this method that many of the Heretics have corrupted the religion and intellects of groups of people, until they expelled them (from it) and led them to the greatest of disbelief and ignorance, and the furthest limit of deviation and misguidance.

[4. Refutation of the Philosophers]

⁷ [Translator's Note]: What is meant here by these phrases "obligatory (wajib), permissibility (jawaaz) or impossibility (mumtani)" is that everything that Allaah is described or named with falls into these three categories. So for example, His existence, knowledge, power and so on are obligatory. And that He "plots (makr)" or "deceives (khidaa'ah)" or "mocks (istihzaa') is permissible for Him – for He does that in relation to those who fall into the likes of this from the Kuffar and Munaafiqeen. And that He is non-existent, or blind, or deaf, or greedy, and the likes, then all of that is impossible. So what the texts have negated is the resemblance between all of what has been affirmed for Allaah (whether it be by obligation, permissibility, or impossibility) in that which is unique and specific to Him alone.

And if the Deniers of the Attributes say that the affirmation of knowledge (‘ilm), power (qudrah), and will (iraadah) necessitates the multiplicity of attributes, and this is a composition (tarkeeb) that is impossible⁸.

It is said, and likewise, when you say that He is “mawjood” (exists), “waajib” (obligatory) and “‘aql, ‘aaqil, ma’qool”, then is it not understood from this (describing Him in this manner) what is understood from that (i.e. describing Him with knowledge, life, power and will)? For these are many different meanings that are [understood separately] in the intellect, and yet this is considered composition (of parts, tarkeeb) by you? So why then have you affirmed it, and call it “Tawheed”.

If they say: This is Tawheed in reality, and it is not the composition (of parts, tarkeeb) that is impossible.

Then it is said in reply to them: And the essence (dhaat) being described with attributes that are binding and necessary for it is also Tawheed in reality, and it is not the composition (of parts) that is impossible.

And this because it is known by sound intellectual (understanding) that the meaning of something being “knowledgeable” (‘aalim) is not the same as the meaning of it being “powerful, able” (qaadir), and nor that its essence (dhaat) is the very same as it being knowing, and able. Hence, whoever permitted that this attribute is the very same as others, and that the attribute itself is synonymous with the (essence of the) thing being described with it, then he is the greatest of people in his sophistry. Additionally, he is contradicting himself, since if he permitted this (mode of argument) then the existence of one thing would be the same as the existence of the other, and then this existence itself would be “bil-‘ayn” (i.e. one congruent, uniform, synonymous existence – i.e. everything is just one existence, i.e. a single entity) not “bil-naw” (i.e. that things exist but the form of their existence varies and is different).

Thus, when the existence of that which is possible (i.e. whatever is created), is the very same as the existence which is obligatory (i.e. Allaah), then the existence of all that is created – that which can be absent after having existed,

⁸ [Translator’s Note]: This is like the sayings of Ibn Seena, “Chapter: Concerning the obligatory (al-Waajib)”, and also “Chapter: That He whose existence is obligatory is intellect, intellectual and understood (‘aql, ‘aaqil, ma’qool)”, and also “Chapter: That He is loved, and loves (ma’shooq, ‘aashiq) with His Dhaat (Essence)”, and also “Chapter: Concerning the verification of the unity of the first [being] (wahdaaniyyat ul-awwal) and that his knowledge is not other than his power, or will, and life in what is understood, and that all of that is a single (entity).” – as occurs in his book “an-Najaat” as has been pointed out by the verifier of the this treatise (at-Tadmuriyyah).

and which can exist after having been absent – then it's (existence) would be exactly the same as the existence of the eternal, continuous, remaining Truth (i.e. Allaah) which does not accept non-existence [i.e. this leads to the saying of wahdat ul-wujood].

And when this (thought) is surmised, then that whose existence is obligatory (i.e. Allaah) can be described with every type of tashbeeh and tajseem, and every deficiency and flaw. As has been explicitly stated by the people of wahdat ul-wujood (the unity of existence), those who have pursued this corrupt principle. And thus (in light of this) the saying of the deniers of the attributes is falsehood in every sense.

And this subject (of the attributes) is actually a reflexive one. For every one of those who deny what the Messenger (sallallaahu alaihi wasallam) has informed of the Attributes, then never does he negate something – fleeing from that which has been cautioned against (i.e. tashbeeh and tajseem) – except that he affirms that which is equivalent to that which he fled from (i.e. tashbeeh and tajseem!).

Hence, it is a must, inevitably, that he affirms one whose existence is obligatory and eternal, and who is described with attributes that distinguish him from others besides him, and that in these attributes, he does not resemble anything from his creation. [So when he arrives at this conclusion], it is then said to him: And this is the saying with respect to all the attributes, and everything that we affirm of the Names and Attributes, then it is necessary that they indicate a meaning that is shared, and in agreement between all things that are named with them, and if this had not been the case then the speech (i.e. the revelation of Allaah) would not have been understood. However we know that that which is specific and unique to Allaah and by which He is distinguished and separated from His creation, is too great to be ever conceived of in the mind or for it to ever pass by the imagination.

Benefits and lessons from this tribunal

1. In the previous lesson, the Prosecution, laid to waste the Ash'arite defence and apologeticism – by illustrating the corruption and contradiction in the principles adduced and invented by them to distinguish between one set of attributes and others.
2. Today, we apply the Prosecution's case to all four categories of people: The Ash'ariyyah, the Mu'tazilah, the Jahmiyyah (and Baatiniyyah), and the Philosophers – and illustrate that they are all upon falsehood, contradiction, bewilderment, and that they themselves fall into what they accuse their opponents with of tashbeeh and tajseem and tarkeeb – and that inevitably they must adopt the path of Ahl us-Sunnah, which is sound, coherent and uniform.
3. The destruction of the Ash'arite thesis has already preceded in the previous tribunal, and it has been repeated today, hence we will not need to summarise it – as it is clear to the jury and the witnesses of Ahl us-Sunnah inshaa'allaah.
4. As for the Mu'tazilah, then they affirm Names, and deny all the attributes, with the argument that the names necessitate “tajseem” (anthropomorphism) – since, as they claim, something that is characterised by the attributes of hearing, seeing, speech, and the likes, cannot be imagined or cannot exist in reality, except in the form of a body (jism) – and thus, it is impossible for Allaah to be described with these attributes, as it would necessitate tajseem. And to this, it is said in reply – using the same argument the Mu'tazili has used for his negation – which is that anything that is called “hearing” (samee'), “seeing” (baseer), “speaking” (mutakallim), “able, powerful” (qadeer) and so on, meaning it is given these names, then it cannot be imagined or exist in reality, except in the form of a body (jism), and everything that is outwardly observed in this creation – which is named with these names, then it is only observed in the form of a body (jism). Hence, affirmation of the names necessitates tajseem – just like you have claimed affirmation of the attributes necessitates tajseem.
5. As for the Jahmites, those who negate all the Names (as well as the attributes), then they do not affirm these names, but speak about Allaah in the form of negation. Thus, they say “He is not existing”, “He is not living”, “He is not knowing”, “He is not able, powerful” and so on – and they mean by this to avoid likening him to that in the creation which exists, is living, is knowing and is able, powerful and which is named with these names. And the reply to this is that in their negation, they have resembled Allaah to the non-existing things (al-ma'doomaat). In other words, whatever is in the creation then its existence is “mumkin” (possible) as opposed to “waajib” (obligatory) – so for example, the existence of a specific human, or the occurrence of a particular matter, then it is

possible but not obligatory – and this is different to Allaah, since His existence is obligatory. Thus in light of this, when the Jahmites speak of Allaah in terms of negation, intending by that to flee from tashbeeh, then they actually fall into tashbeeh, but into that which is worse. For they liken Him to the non-existent things (al-ma'doomaat) – those that are described in terms of negation only, but whose existence, nevertheless is still possible.

When they have been refuted in this matter, they then say, in that case we negate both affirmation and negation from him. What they mean is that we will not speak of him in terms of affirmation or negation, rather we negate both of these (affirmation and negation) from Him in every Name.

And here they have merely fallen into that which is worse than what they stated before, which is that instead of likening him to those things which are non-existent (ma'doom) (yet which have the possibility of existence), they now liken him with the impossible things. Since it is impossible for something to be “existing” and “non-existing” at the same time, regardless of whether you affirm two opposites, or negate two opposites. So this is from the “impossible” matters (al-mumtani'aat) that a thing neither exists, nor not exists, or that a thing is neither seeing nor blind and so on.

Then when the Jahmites are refuted in this manner, they then say that negating two complete opposites can only be done for that thing which can actually accept either of the two opposites. But as for those things which cannot accept either of the two opposite (names or attributes) then the issue of negating two complete opposites does not arise in the first place. So for example a wall does not accept being called “hearing” and “deaf” or “seeing” and “blind”. Thus, the issue of negation of two complete opposites does not apply in this case, and hence, it cannot be said to be from the “impossible” matters in this case. And by this they argue that since Allaah does not accept these pairs of two opposites (as names or attributes), then to negate them from Him, does not make Him from the “impossible” things (al-mumtani'aat).

Then the Prosecution replies to this from three angles:

Firstly: that if we accept the example given, then though this might be correct with certain pairs of opposites, then it certainly cannot be correct with respect to the opposites of “existing” and “non-existing”, since these are diametrically opposed to each other from every single angle. Thus, when one of them is raised the other will apply and vice versa. So it is either this or the other. And hence, negating both of these opposites from something renders it to be from the impossible things. So it cannot be said that a wall “exists” and does “not-

exist” at the same time, or that we negate from it “existence” and “non-existence” at one and the same time.

Secondly: Then you have only made matters worse, since those things that can accept “life” and “death”, or “seeing” and “blindness” and so on, yet does not have these attributes are more perfect than those things that cannot accept these descriptions in principle. So for example, the blind man (for whom sight is certainly possible), then even though he does not have sight, while he can certainly accept the attribute of sight, then he is more perfect than a wall which cannot accept the attribute of sight, and does not have sight. Thus, the Jahmite has fled from making tashbeeh with Allaah in relation to the animate things (those that can be characterised with life, hearing, seeing and so on) and has now made tashbeeh with Allaah in relation to the inanimate things, those things that cannot accept these opposing attributes in principle (i.e. life and death, or hearing and dumbness, or seeing and blindness and the likes).

Then in addition to this, you have, by this falsehood of yours, made the existence of Allaah to be from amongst the greatest of impossible things, since you have argued that Allaah does not accept the attributes of existence and non-existence or seeing and blindness, thus, as well as likening Him to the impossible things (with respect to the opposites other than existence and non-existence), then you have also made him to be from the greatest of impossible things (with respect to the opposites of existence and non-existence).

And thirdly, what the Sharee’ah and the sound intellect negates is there being any resemblance between that which is unique and specific to Allaah alone, concerning the realities behind these Names, or those things that are either obligatory, permissible or impossible for Allaah – thus the creation cannot share with Him in any of that. And it is this that the Sharee’ah has negated.

6. As for the Philosophers, such as the likes of Ibn Seenaa and other heretics (mulhids and zindeeqs), then they say that ascribing any attributes to anything renders it composite, i.e. made up of parts (tarkeeb), and thus, this is impossible. However, the Philosophers themselves, describe Allaah with more than one name or attribute so they say He is “mawjood”, or that He is “waajib” (meaning His existence is obligatory), and they also say “He is intellect (‘aql)”, or “The First Cause”, and other such affairs. And all of these terms they have used, then they have separate meanings in one’s intellect and they are distinguished from each other, in concept and meaning. Thus, how can they accept this, when they themselves call the likes of this to be “tarkeeb” (i.e. a composition that is impossible). They reply that this is not actually tarkeeb, but it is Tawheed in reality. That this is the real and true Tawheed. So the

Prosecution replies to them that similarly naming Him with Names and attributes, then that is not tarkeeb either, it is Tawheed in reality.

Then additionally, it is impossible for different attributes with different meanings to be synonymous with each other or to be synonymous with the thing that is described with them (i.e they are all the same entity, indistinguishable). This is an impossible matter. And whoever claimed that this can be so, then he has opened up the door to the wicked and evil belief of disbelief, which is the belief of unity of existence (wahdat ul-wujood).

And this precursor (i.e. this thought of the Philosophers) is what led the people to conclude that the existence of Allaah is but the whole of existence – based on the notion that all the different names and attributes are representative of a single thing, and are synonymous, and everything that each name is the entity itself, and that each attribute is the entity itself. And they were led to this state when they left the Book and the Sunnah and resorted to their intellects.

So the Ashaa'irah open up the door for the Mu'tazilah, and the Mu'tazilah open up the door for the Jahmiyyah, and the Jahmiyyah open up the door for the Baatiniyyah and Philosophers. So a person may start as an Ash'ari, and then seeing the falsehood of his position, he tends to the view that the Mu'tazilah are upon Tawheed, and then when the Jahmiyyah get to him, he thinks that the Jahmiyyah are upon Tawheed, and then he sees the words of the Baatiniyyah and Philosophers and he sees that there is no harm in it as that is the truth!

Thus, the end result of all of this (i.e. the negation of the Names and Attributes) is that it leads the person to that which is even greater than that which he originally fled from of tashbeeh, and tajseem. And therefore, it is inevitable, that a person returns to the affirmation of the one whose existence is obligatory and eternal, and who is described with attributes that distinguish him from others besides him, and that in these attributes, he does not resemble anything from his creation – and thus this path be adopted with all of that which has been reported in the texts concerning the Names and Attributes.

7. The essence of this matter is that Ahl us-Sunnah refute all the various factions, with the very same that they themselves refute Ahl us-Sunnah each other. Since, whatever they refute Ahl us-Sunnah with, is itself a refutation, in principle of what they themselves are upon. Rather, they flee from one thing (tashbeeh and tajseem) and fall into something that is more repugnant.

SUMMARY OF THIS TRIBUNAL

The Ash'ariyyah (The Seveners):

- 1) We negate attributes of face, anger, pleasure, love, istawaa etc. as they necessitate tashbeeh and tajseem. REPLY: Then likewise, hearing, seeing, life, and will, they too necessitate tashbeeh and tajseem.
- 2) But we affirm the attributes that are proven by the intellect. REPLY: And the attributes of pleasure, love, wisdom, hatred, are too proven by the intellect.

The Mu'tazilah (Negate All Attributes Affirm Names Only):

- 1) We negate any attribute since attributes can only be given to those things that exist as bodies (ajsaam, pl. of jism) and nothing is observed that is characterised by attributes except that it is a body. REPLY: Then nothing is observed that is named with names except that it is a body, so you must deny all the names as well.

The Jahmiyyah (Negate All Names and Attributes):

- 1) We do not affirm any names or attributes since this entails resemblance to the creation, rather we negate all names and attributes. REPLY: Then you have likened Him instead, to the non-existing things (ma'doomaat) – those that are not characterised by names and attributes.
- 2) But we negate both affirmation and negation. So we do not describe him with negations either. REPLY: Then you have likened Him instead to the impossible things (mumtani'aat) – which are those things that can accept two opposites simultaneously.
- 3) But this only applies to those things that can actually accept either of two opposites as attributes, not to those things that cannot accept them to begin with, such as a wall, it cannot accept being “seeing” or “blind”. REPLY 1: This argument cannot hold for the two opposites of “existence” and “non-existence”. REPLY 2: That which cannot accept description with either of these pairs of opposites (life, death, sight, blindness, hearing, deafness etc.) is more deficient than that which can. So a blind man (who can accept the attribute of seeing) is superior than a wall, which cannot accept this attribute in principle. Thus, you have likened Him to that which is inanimate (while attempting to flee from likening Him to the animate things). REPLY 3: That which cannot accept the opposites of existence and non-existence, is from the greatest of impossible things – and hence you have likened Allaah with them, by negating these two opposites from Him. REPLY 4: Agreement in name between the creation and the Creator in some names and attributes is not tashbeeh or tajseem. What the Sharee'ah texts negate is the creation

having any share in those realities that are unique and specific to the Creator concerning these names and attributes.


The Philosophers:

- 1) Affirmation of attributes necessitates “tarkeeb” (i.e. something being composed of parts) – thus we deny all attributes (and names). REPLY: But you yourself describe Him with different terms, that have different concepts and meanings, and which can be distinguished from each other in the intellect. Hence, you also fall into “tarkeeb” (i.e. claiming He is composed of parts).
- 2) But what we describe Him with is the true and real Tawheed, this is Tawheed and reality. REPLY: Then likewise, what we describe Him with (of Names and Attributes), that is Tawheed in reality – and that He is described with them is Tawheed in reality.
- 3) But all attributes must therefore be synonymous to each other and the very same as the thing that is being described with them, and thus it is one inseparable whole, a single entity. REPLY: The sound intellect demonstrates that being “knowledgeable” is not the same as being “kind” and being “able, powerful” is not the same as being “hearing” or “seeing”. Otherwise if you permit this, then you have opened the door to belief in the unity of existence between Allaah and the creation, and thus you have fallen into the greatest of that which originally intended to flee from. So you fled from tarkeeb, tajseem and tashbeeh, and you tend towards its worst manifestation – by way of your principles.

The Bottom Line: This whole subject is reflexive. Thus, anyone who negates any of the Names or Attributes, fleeing from tashbeeh, tajseem or tarkeeb, then by necessity, he will fall into what is equivalent to, or much worse than that which he originally fled from. Thus, it is inevitable that He affirms everything that is affirmed in the Book and the Sunnah, without differentiation, and that He negate everything that is negated in the Book and the Sunnah – and be content and happy with this, as this is the way of the Salaf and it is the most safe and the most precise (aslam, ahkam).

CLOUD JAHMEE: THE CLOUD OF MISGUIDANCE AND CONFUSION

The Route To Kufr (Disbelief)



Combination of these falsehoods leads to precipitation of the Jahme cloud and subsequent rainfall

Jahmic Acid Rain: Corrodes and Damages the Agedah and Erodes and Undermines Imaan in Allaah And Corrupts the Foundations of Ibaadah and Causes the People to Be Distant From Allaah